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Student:Dayong Zhou

dayong_77@hotmail.com


The Collectivizationa and De-collectivization in Rural China

周大勇 (Zhou,Dayong)

Abstract: the process of de-collectivization took place 25 years ago, however it was uncompleted, which determined that china has to make great effort to continue his rural reform, in order to liberate the peasant and the status of rural region as the Party promised. In China, the non-privatization reform occurred along with the de-collectivization was a uncompleted reform, which remains the defects of both collectivization and small-scale peasant economy, therefore it restricts the development of the rural society, however, the current system seems unable also reluctantly to change it. This paper intents to introduce the process of the collectivization and the most important rural reform in this century, namely the de-collectivization, the demonstrates the progression of de-collectivization, its characters as well as the problems left to be solve.
Keywords: collectivization De-collectivization collective ownership incomplete

Foreword
I am pleased that I am allowed to write the term paper about China. China was influenced by Marxism and walked in detour of history for half century. Before Marxism bankrupted in former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries, China had adopted a different way to reform from those countries. Because of the difference in aspects of historical evolution, political forms and natural environment, it’s hard to compare the rural society of China with these former socialism countries directly, also, the progression of collectivization and its end are different in two continents.
Rural china before collectivization
Collectivization was a mark system of the socialist state. Although in the era of Utopian socialism, Robert Owen for example has already attempted to set up the collective farm, but it wasn’t pursued by force strength of government. Even the founder of communism Marx didn’t agree that communism could be realized in undeveloped countries with extremely poor productivity . It was Russia, the serf country, in which Communist took power without adequate preparation; collectivization was implemented by force, in order to consolidate the rule in grass-root countryside. This experience has influenced China and Eastern Europe, because one of the merits of the collectivization lies in being easy to be managed, the other lies in being easy to deprive peasants.
China was a backward country, which suffered from ignorance and war for centuries. Throughout the centuries some 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese population were farmers and live in one of some 900,000 villages, which have an average population of from 1,000 to 2,000 people. Villages were not self-contained, self-sufficient units. Clusters of villages centered on small market towns, which linked them to the wider economy and society by providing not only opportunities to buy and sell but also opportunities for entertainment, information, social life, and a host of specialized services. The traditional Chinese elite, often referred to in English as the gentry dispersed across the country and often lived in rural areas, where they were the dominant figures on the local scene, normally ruled villages. Although they held land, which they rented to tenant farmers, they neither possessed large estates like European nobles nor held hereditary titles. However, they traditionally interpreted central policies and national values for villagers. As in feudal relationship, the peasants and gentry live depend on each other. Gentry provided land to poor peasants and tenant, and work with rich and middle peasants to secure the order in village, for instance opening school and building basic infrastructures to maintain there social status. In Chinese history, at the beginning of very dynasty, the land relationship between landlord and poor peasants were comparably fair, that meant, peasant have parcel farmland to live on. But land tended to be concentrated on end every dynasty, then there might be a peasant uprising led to a new dynasty and retribution of land. This is the basic clue of social evolution in China before communist period.
After the Chinese Communist Party came into power in mainland, it had to keep its promise, which it made during the period of war to encourage the peasant to join the army, that it would gave peasant their own land. The first major action took place from 1940s to early 1950s. June 1950, a new Land Reform Law of new People’s Republic was promulgated and stipulated nullification of the feudal land ownership system, and institutionalization of the system of land ownership by peasants, in which the Party sent agents to every village to carry out the land reform policy. This in itself was an unprecedented show of political power and the resolution of transform an old society. The reform was successful, because the peasants supported the policy; most of them had been waiting for the reform for long time. In the light of the reform law, land were redistribute from the landlords, land-owning trusts or wealthier families to the poor segments in the same village; village elites, who might be expected to go up against the Party and its programs were brought down; new leadership was established by poor peasants who showed the most loyalty to the party's goals; instead of kinship group or patron-client ties, class status became new relationship among villagers.
the process of Collectivization
However, the Party’s leaders were not satisfied with the privatization of land, at one hand, such ownership, according to the doctrine of socialism, should have been abolished in the state of socialism, at another hand, private ownership of small peasantry had no function of property accumulation for the country. At that time, in order to accelerate the construction of socialism, China had launched The First Five-Year Plan after the Soviet model; heavy industry development was profound stressed since the leaders of Communist Party regard socialist country as a country with developed industry sectors. However, the situation in early 1950s was not ideal for a new country. Pressing of needs for food in a country with burgeoning population, domestic capital for investment, and purchase of Soviet-supplied technology, capital equipment, and military hardware. To satisfy these needs, collectivize agriculture was put forward. Collectivization was regard as a method to turn countryside to stabile backing, which can be managed as semi-military and had rare contact with outside, so that the government could press the price of agricultural products by means of scissors difference between cities and countryside, and seize huge numbers of profit from agriculture economies to support the industrialization in city. At the same time, the government had already nationalized banking, industry, and even trade. Private enterprise was already virtually abolished in national wide.
Despite internal disagreement as to the speed of collectivization, preliminary collectivization was launched since 1952. China's peasantry saw Chairman Mao and the Communist Party as heroic much more than Russia's peasantry had seen Stalin and the Bolsheviks as heroes, and through 1956 the peasantry cooperated with the Party. There was none of the resistance and warfare that had accompanied the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union.
The collectivization of agriculture was basically completed with the establishment of the people's communes in 1958. The People’s Commune system was defined as a unity of politics and production, in which all members of the commune jointly owned property. Essentially, the commune system was based on private contract of its members and the principle of voluntaries and mutual benefit, however, it turned out yet as coercive institutional arrangement, which was made by government with political power. In the movement to achieve the People’ s Commune, peasants had no choice whether or not to join.
Communes were designed as large, embracing scores of villages created by combining some 20 or 30 advanced producers' cooperatives of 20,000 to 30,000 members on average, in some cases the membership varied from as few as 6,000 to over 40,000. It was instituted as an organization with functions of the lowest level of local government and the highest level of organization in agricultural production. Communes consisted of three organizational levels: the central commune administration; the production brigade , and the production team, which generally consisted of around thirty families. This kind of institution was an organization of hierarchies, in which the commune acted as political unit and top manager, the brigades played role of co-coordinators between the commune and the basic production teams. The production team was basic units of production and accounting. Since the people’s commune system was a tool established to extract resources from agriculture sector for industrialization, as a result, it neglected peasants’ incentive completely. In order to let the people’s commune system run, the central government designed an relative effective mechanism to encourage managers in each hierarchy to work enthusiastically, yet, in each level, the managers were treated differently and there was a clear difference in aspects of identity and welfare between the managers of the commune and of the brigades or production teams.
The commune was defined as administrative organ and executed the central government’s orders, and paid from central government’s budget, therefore the managers in the level of commune were “state cadres” , that means they were formal governmental officials and got wage monthly. These state cadres could be promoted and became officials of governmental divisions in higher level. Brigades and production teams were collective economic organizations, their running expenses came from production teams’ tribute. Managers in brigades level were called “collective cadres” . They were remunerated in their own production teams according to their labor quotas. Their wage was paid in the form of products instead of money. Managers in production teams were“team cadres”, they were also members of the production team. They worked as peasant like their workmates, and were paid in products according to labor quotas. Team cadres could be promoted to collective cadres. Collective and team cadres had little possibilities to be promoted and became members of state cadres. Nevertheless, as collective and team cadres had some privileges. For example, collective managers had the power of assigning state’s delivery quotas and production tasks among production teams, they determined who could enrolled in state-owned factories, universities and army. The production team managers executed the power of assigning work and distributing products among collective members. Furthermore, in the period of many political movements and class struggles, the identity of cadre could protect their families, relatives and themselves from being denounced and bullied (Tan, 1999).
At beginning, the commune itself was decorated as the representation of socialist society and had all merits of public ownership. Although nearly all the private property had been deprived, peasants had to praise the new system profusely. it was true, most poor peasants found that their lives changed, by eating in the public dining they didn’t need to worry about their own budget anymore, and by working together, they were not necessary to try their best. Following propaganda appeared in newspapers everyday:
The public dining halls are distributed in a way that members need walk only a few minutes from their homes to take their meals. On the freshly whitewashed walls of the one on Shihfuchien Street, a typical establishment, there is a big slogan in red, which reads, "High Spirits for Higher Production!" Its kitchen, to which the visitor is drawn by the aroma of food and the clatter of pots, is managed by Tu Hsiu-chen, the first volunteer cook, who has since learned large-scale catering from the chef at one of the city's restaurants.
The walls of the spacious dining room are decorated with paintings, as a home might be. Its tables and chairs, though simple, are scrubbed to a shining cleanliness. The food is fresh and tasty -- vegetables are grown by the commune itself. The staff make a special point of studying the diet and preferences of old people, children, nursing mothers and members with ailments. There is a separate room for parents with small children, provided with low tables for the little ones.( People’s Daily, 1958)
However, in practice, this ideal, extremely centralized form commune didn’t keep running well in most areas. Very soon it became clear that in most cases the communes were too clumsy to carry out successfully all the managerial and administrative functions that were assigned to them. The cooperative led to low-efficiency, the advantages of large-scale productivity didn’t arrive as peasants anticipated, productivity began to drop and discontent emerged. The reason lies in insufficient utilization of resources and lack of incentive of peasants. At one hand, the output of cooperation comes from all members’ work, in which the tribute of single household is difficult to be measured. So that opportunism like shirking happened naturally very frequently. An effective way to prevent shirking is to have all members supervised, but the seasonal work and spatial diversity of agricultural productive activities make it difficult to totally supervise. At the other hand, although brigade and production team cadres were obliged to complete state’s planning and all kinds of deliveries, the control right and residual claim of the people’s commune system were in the state’s hand, these cadres at grass-level could not design any reasonable incentive mechanism to encourage peasants to work hard and produce according to reasonable natural condition, such as soil, irrigation and farm year. The way left for brigade and team cadres was to punish peasants by struggling against them or maltreatment. But the brigade and team cadres also belonged to members of production teams, they and their families lived in the same community with their subordinates as well, so punishing peasants could also make themselves in trouble. Moreover, under the property rights structure of the commune system, the rest of output was not belong to the commune, brigade or even production team, but to the governments of higher level. This made the supervisors’ effort unrelated to any reward. As a result, even the supervisor himself has not enough incentive to work and shirk himself sometimes. In a word, under such conditions of poor supervision, in which all the work was distributed equally among all members at the lowest level--production team, shirking became every member’s rational choice and further weakening the efficiency of the system (Lin,1990).
De-collectivization
To prevent peasants from slow down, shrinking and escaping in work, and assure the system could keep on moving, the party collected all productive equipments and forbid members in people’s commune engaging in private production and business on the one hand, and at same time deprived peasants’ right of migrating from countryside to city or between districts by means of household registration on the other hand. Nevertheless, such policies had no effect on improving incentive of peasants, but they formed at least political press on very member of people’s commune, because it turned out that everyone’s only routine is to stay in the commune and finish one’s task. Without the right to leave or get better than others, peasants commonly chose to work with little effort, e.g. a passive method, to evade production tasks assigned by leader. Little accumulation and shirking made countryside widely fall into poverty , rare rural region had good conditions to develop industry or to improve commerce, infrastructures went worse, productivity sank quickly. The most serious crisis for agricultural collectivization happened between 1959 and 1961. GNP decreased from 213.8 billion Yuan in 1958 to 180.0 billion Yuan in 1962, with an average annual reduction of 15.1% in gross industrial production value and an average annual reduction of 19.3% in gross agricultural production value from 1958 to 1960. Owing to the serious shortage of food, a great famine took place in the whole country and at least 30 million residents died (Tan, 2000). Discontent with such system broke out, in some areas, peasants didn’t want to relied so heavily on orders from above and made so little allowance for local conditions or local initiative. The severe crisis forced the Party to adjust their policies. From 1961 on, commune functions were reduced to administration and co-ordination, production team was confirmed as the basic unit of accounting, certain production decision making was delegated to production teams, which were allowed to retain some income to overcome problems of egalitarianism; households again allowed to have small private plots and sidelines for planting vegetables, and a limited opening markets for transaction between urban and rural areas. However, these adjustments didn’t mean to change the system of people’s commune, but only to prevent peasants from rebel. From 1966 to 1976 China suffered the disaster of Cultural Revolution , there were large institutional swings took place in this period, in which co-operative moved from small to large and from team to brigade to commune again, local free markets, sidelines and private plots was prohibited again, and political factors had a great influence on production decisions.
In late 1970s, after the Leader Chairman Mao passed away, the requirement for improving agricultural productivity came alive. Administrators in provincial-level units with extensive regions of low yields and consequent low standards of living began experimenting with new forms of tenure and production. To avoid frontal conflicts of wide scope with government’s policies and the main ideology, a gradual approach was adopted. The first step of reform was to divide the production team into groups and to fix yield quotas for each group. Each group signed a contract with production team, the contractual items included the conditions of using land, laborers, farm tools and draft animals, the expenditure, labor contribution, rewards for excessive labor contribution and so on. After completing the tasks assigned by the production team, the output could be distributed among work groups according to their labor quotas. And then, the further solution was put forward, namely the typical form of fixing quotas called “all-round contract”, which was initiated by a few brave peasant secretly in Fengyang county of Anhui province. this contract regulated, household was allowed to cultivated a certain parcel farmland in the group, if grain quotas assigned by the state and the collective accumulation were accomplished, the household could own all the residual output. In the light of the contract, peasants were given directly stimulation to produce. The experiment was deemed successful and popular, and it soon spread to all districts.
At another side, political situation was appropriate with the reform form below. In the Eleventh National Party Congress, held August 12- 18, 1977 proclaimed the formal end of the Cultural Revolution, blamed it entirely on the Gang of Four , and reiterated that "the fundamental task of the party in the new historical period is to build China into a modern, powerful socialist country by the end of the twentieth century." The reformer Deng Xiaoping was elected as vice chairman and back to political stage and suggested a series of reform plans, though many contradictions still were apparent, change of policy was regarded as necessary. Rehabilitations of Deng's associates and others sympathetic to these reform plans were stepped up. Not only were some of those purged during the Cultural Revolution returned to power, but also individuals who had fallen from favor as early as the mid-1950s were rehabilitated. It was a time of increased political activism.
In November 1980, the Central Committee of Communist Party of China issued the document Some Issues of Further Reinforcing and Improving the Responsibility System in Agricultural Production. This article manifest the first time that the Party accepted the production responsibility systems developing in practice. In the document fixed output quotas of farmland for each group and responsibility contracts in some specialized obligations were indicated, at the same time, the fixed output quotas for household was also regarded as positive. Under the encouragement of government’s policy and related support measures, plenty of production responsibility systems developed very rapidly in rural areas. In 1981, a wide deeper reform called fixing the contribute quote for each household (bao gan dao hu), which was much more radical, was implemented. In accordance to the system, all collective lands in production teams were to be distributed among households based on their population or laborers. The households could manage the lands, made production decisions by themselves, and bore the results. When tasks assigned by upper government and the collective accumulation, e.g. a certain quantity of grain and livestock, were completed, the remained products could be owned by the households and not distributed among members in the production team. Moreover, if the household made sure that they have enough ration, they had right to sell the left grain to state owned agricultural enterprises or consume them as they want, usually feeding livestock or making wine for example. That meant the model from Fengyang was finally admitted by Party. In October 1983, the Party and the State Counsel issued the document Notice of Separating the Co-operative from Politics and Setting Up the Township Government and required the cooperative to separate from local government. The act ordered that the people's communes were replaced by administrative townships. By the end of 1984, 98% of production teams had taken the reform of Household Responsibility System. It was until then, the collectivization system was dismantled completely.
Some Characters of De-collectivization and Problems left
No restitution
Yet, de-collectivization and the implement of the household responsibility system is neither a reform of the ownership of land nor a process of privatization. As we have mentioned above, after the Communist Party set up its own government in 1949, it started land reform and distributed lands to the poor from landlords and rich peasants. Peasant acquired parcels of land according to the labor forces, then land were registered under name of each household. Before the eve of collectivization, most of lands in rural China were legally privately owned. But when de-collectivization began, peasants did not get back their former lands again. The household responsibility system only distribute the right of manage and benefit of lands among households according to their population or laborers. So, the de-collectivization in China did not like that in most of East European countries such as Bulgaria, Czech, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, but like that in Albania. That is to say, there was no restitution of land. However, in former East European Countries, whether restitution was implemented or not, the de-collectivization had symbiosis with privatization. In China, although during the process of de-collectivization there were in reality some opinions that lands should be restituted, such voices were not accepted, nor even discussed.
The reasons why restitution of land in the de-collectivization of rural China did not happen may lie in some historic reasons. First of all, although peasants in China had private ownership over lands before the collectivization, large percent of peasants owned farmlands that did not belong to them before, they obtain them from political transformation. Theoretically, violence can’t consist the legal reason of transfer of ownership over real estate, therefore even after the terrorize during the land reform at beginning of 1950s, the private ownership of lands, which was made out by the communist government, had not yet became stable and commonly accepted. However, the former landlord class had rooted off during the political movement, land contacts and register books of land title had been destroyed, no one dare to challenge the power of Communist Party anymore. Since the collectivization began soon after the land reform, the new established owner relationship was broken again, when de-collectivization came about, without supports from the central government, most of peasants only took the household responsibility system as another chance of equally distributing lands, just like the land reform in 1949. As to descendants of former landlord class, they might have not forgotten the experience of their poor ancestors’: claiming private right before the Party which regarding public ownership as universal truth is a dangerous deal.
Secondly, different from most country in former communist east European countries , in which farmers’ nominal ownership of lands was remained, even though their lands were requisitioned in collective farms without any payment, and so that it was easy for peasants in these countries to take back the land when the collective farms went over. On the contrary, in China, private ownership of land was totally abolished as soon as the people’s commune system was set up, after 20 years, the collective ownership had already fest basis. As a result, the transaction costs of restitution so high as to wipe it out. That means, even a peasant want to take back the former farmland which belonged to them, it’s very hard to him to collect the relevant evidences to support his claim, moreover, there was no legal justice process to support such application. So normal farmer would rather to accept the Household Responsibility System.
Finally, the key reason lies in the socialism system itself. Even though the Communist Party of had poor performance in leading the country and its people to wealth and happiness during socialist revolution, Chinese people have taken socialism as the characteristic of the country for grant, after all the slogan “ Socialism saved China” has been deeply impressed. So that even after the Culture Revolution, most people still propped up the Party. The Party led the rural reform and decided the de-collectivization. However, the reform is a “liberation of the rural productivity”, which suit the requirement of the Party. Because the Chinese Communist Party insisted that his mission is to realize socialism, and socialism is based on public ownership system. Collective ownership was deemed as one form of public ownership in rural regions, so that as China kept on the road of realizing socialism, “land in rural areas belong to collective” was certainly remained after rural reform, and regulated in the Constitution of 1982, which is valid till now.
At the time of de-collectivization, the dissolution of people’s commune and the wide implement of responsibility system were regard as a great innovation. According to the statistic, The Household Responsibility System did bring about a more prosperous agriculture in China. From 1978 to 1984, grain output in China increased at an annual average rate of 5% and the gross value of agriculture by 7.7% (Lin, 1997). In contrast with former European countries, the de-collectivization seems bring more benefit to Chinese peasants at beginning. So that at that time, rare peasant did realize that such a reform without transformation of ownership was incompletely. However, The natural shortcomings of the de-collectivization would surely bring a series of problems.
institutional problem: land distribution
As we showed above, the de-collectivization ran smoothly and the introduction of Household Responsibility System has got a great success, although it could not address everything as only an institutional innovation. After several years of practice, it has been already proved that there are a number of weaknesses and limitations remained from the incompletely de-collectivization. One has to confirm, that the collective ownership and contract system led to the inequity in both economic and political features.
In economic view, during the de-collectivization, farmland was distributed to individual households in form of fragmented farming units. The principle of land distribution was derived directly from collective ownership. Farmland in a village was owned by all of its members collectively. As a result, every member had equal right to claim on distribution of the land according to certain norm, which was based primarily on the size of the peasant family. In reality of China with abundant population and limited land, the amount can be distributed to each household was very small. Moreover, land differed from each other in terms of soil fertility, irrigation conditions, location and so on. In many cases, a household had to obtain pieces of land from each of the grades. as a result, the sum was not only insufficient but also disjointed and scattered around villages. Large areas of cultivated land were wasted in the form of paths and boundaries separating households' contract field. A survey conducted by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture indicated that in 1986, among 7983 sample villages from 29 provinces, average cultivated area per household was 0.466 ha (7 mu) fragmented into 5.85 plots, each plot on average 0.08 ha (1.2 mu) (Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1993) . This fragmented structure of family farming has remained largely untouched after implement of contract system and has detained the possibilities of using relatively advanced mechanical agricultural equipment and infrastructures.
Under such system, farmers turned to be short-term in action. According to the distribute rule of land in household responsibility system, land is to distribute depended only on villager status, babies and villagers' new-comer such as newly married bride from other villages were all eligible claimants, which having equal rights to share equal amounts of land in this village; on the contrary, when a villager left or died, the right of land claim would automatically withdraw. As population increased, villages had to readjust the distribution structure, which further subdivided the farmland . The endless redistribution of farmland resulted in many problems, including: 1) the situation of a small and fragmented farming structure further deteriorated; 2) worrying about the risk of losing their land as well as investment, farmers had little incentives to improve land conservation and agricultural infrastructure - irrigated land, one of the most significant components of agricultural infrastructure in China, remained almost unchanged during the 1980s; 3) farmers over-exploited the soil to pursue short-term profits; 4) the course of land redistribution was also costly, it required labor and time in organization and execution. (Chen, 1999)
Another problem is that farmland was generally badly endowed with the appropriate human capital. Since egalitarianism was the general leading principle rule, which gave little consideration to interfamily differences such as labor capability, education and individual preference . As a result, some large households with a incomplete labor force could have comparably much more land to cultivate, meanwhile other smaller households, above all those specialized in agriculture, could have only inadequate land for full employment. Such kind of problem was much worse in rural areas experiencing rapid township or village industry and urbanization. In those region there was often deterioration in the agricultural labor force since most of capable labors tended not to work at home as a farmer. There were many who did not give priority to cultivation and at times even let the land lie unused. Consequently, the farmland was underutilized .
Upon preceding analyzing, we can see that, in order to pursue egalitarianism on surface in distribution of land, in the process of the de-collectivization sacrificed economic efficiency. Thus, if the land was private, then those difference arouse from distribution will decease after enough time, because the free market will lead to equal efficiency through the choose of market. However, such political background lacked from beginning on, so that the shortcoming of a non-privatization de-collectivization can’t be corrected or even be enlarged because of problem of political system.
One of the main reason is political structure over the collective ownership. First at grass-root level, it was usually the village head, who takes the power to decide distribution since decentralization. So that the cadre family or their relations will surely benefit from the distribution. Having a cadre in the family seems to be a certain prerogative in using their political status to accumulate wealth. At one hand, Village cadres may allocate more fertile parts of the village land to themselves and determined more favorable grain sales quotas for themselves. And also, cadres have more opportunity to build personal relationship with higher level and other important departments, rural credit banks or transportation companies for example, so that they have more chance to obtain material benefit than normal peasants. As we see, most of collective enterprises and private economies in rural areas have tight relationship with local governments, at the basic level, with villager cadres, most rural enterprisers are villager leader themselves. Furthermore, cadres and their relations generally tend to break the policy of birth control, because they are capable to support more family members, and their kin will strengthen their economic and political power in return.
At another hand, though according to the election regulation of rural cadre in china, these village cadre should be elected directly by villagers, who have common interest in the community, this rule has been almost never put into practice. Under one Party system and public ownership system, all important resources are gathered in the Party’s hand, as a result, instead of election, the opinion from higher level plays a significant role, in order to carry ort the policy of Party efficiently. In fact, two factors determine the candidates in appointment of village head, one is the relationship with official of higher level, and the other is kinship. Consequently, cadre family takes all advantages to maintain their power and status through such appointment. So, cadres in rural China don’t represent the benefit of their village members, but the power of the Party as well as the family, there is no possibility for peasants to claim equality or save their from suffering as a peasant.
In a word, after a short flourish in rural China, which came along with the de-collectivization and the implement of Household Responsibility System, most peasants have to face the irrational occupation and distribution system of farmland and the political system, which is impossible to change. Besides there was strict limitation prevent peasants from abandoning their responsible land and rushing into cities, so that the peasants found it is hard to change their situation or turn it more better and free. This may explain why in rural china exists always the tendency of over population but the income of household began to decrease only after less than 10 years from the de-collectivization. As a result, land reform in China has emerged as a difficult issue in rural areas of exchange between social equality and economic efficiency. It seems obvious that since the mid-1980s the wide rural society has been caught in this predicament: where social equality or equity worsened, and at same time economic efficiency held back.. According to statistics, average net income in countryside has been slowed down for years. In 2000, the household average income only reached 272 dollars, but the Gini coefficient in China base in urban and rural areas rose from 0.21 in 1978 to more than 0. 46.
广东省人大常委会


广东省法律援助条例（修订）



广东省第十届人民代表大会常务委员会



公 告



（第63号）



《广东省法律援助条例》已由广东省第十届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十七次会议于2006年9月28日修订通过，现将修订后的《广东省法律援助条例》公布，自2007年1月1日起施行。





广东省人民代表大会常务委员会

2006年9月28日


广东省法律援助条例



（1999年8月15日广东省第九届人民代表大会常务委员会第十一次会议通过 2006年9月28日广东省第十届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十七次会议修订）



第一章 总则



第一条 为促进和规范法律援助工作，根据国务院《法律援助条例》，结合本省实际，制定本条例。

第二条 本条例所称法律援助，是指县级以上人民政府设立的法律援助机构组织法律援助人员，为经济困难或者人民法院指定辩护案件的当事人免费提供的法律服务。

本条例所称法律援助人员，包括实施法律援助的律师、基层法律服务工作者和法律援助机构安排的其他人员。

第三条 各级人民政府司法行政部门监督管理本行政区域的法律援助工作。

各级法律援助机构负责本辖区的法律援助日常工作，并对法律援助事项办理情况进行监督、检查。上级法律援助机构指导下级法律援助机构的工作。

律师协会应当按照律师协会章程对依本条例实施的法律援助工作予以协助。

第四条 县级以上人民政府应当建立法律援助经费保障制度，将法律援助所需经费列入财政预算，使法律援助事业与经济社会协调发展。

法律援助经费应当设立专户，专款专用，并接受财政、审计部门的监督。

第五条 法律援助经济困难标准由省人民政府根据我省国民经济和社会发展、法律援助的资源和需求，以及公民支付法律服务费用的能力等因素制定。

有条件的市、县可以逐步扩大法律援助的范围，制定适用于本行政区域的法律援助经济困难标准。

第六条 国家机关、社会团体、企业事业单位及有关人员应当支持法律援助工作。

第七条 律师应当依法承担法律援助义务。每名律师每年应当承办法律援助案件两件以上。法律援助案件不足以让本地每名律师每年承办两件的，由司法行政部门从法律援助案件多的地区调节。

基层法律服务工作者应当承担与其工作领域和业务能力相适应的法律援助义务。

律师事务所和乡镇、街道法律服务所无正当理由，不得拒绝承办本辖区法律援助机构指派的法律援助事项。

第八条 法律援助机构和法律援助人员在提供法律援助过程中，必须以事实为根据，以法律为准绳，恪守职业道德和执业纪律。



第二章 对象、范围与方式



第九条 公民申请法律援助，具备以下条件的，可以获得法律援助：

（一）所申请的法律援助事项在本省审理或者处理；

（二）符合省人民政府及当地人民政府规定的法律援助经济困难标准；

（三）因维护自身合法权益需要法律帮助。

第十条 民政部门直属管理的非营利性质的福利组织，因维护其合法的民事权益需要法律帮助的，法律援助机构根据其申请可以提供法律援助。

第十一条 刑事诉讼中有下列情形之一的，法律援助机构应当提供法律援助：

（一）盲、聋、哑人，限制行为能力人，开庭审理时不满十八周岁的未成年人为刑事被告人而没有委托辩护人的；

（二）可能被判处死刑的被告人没有委托辩护人的，或者人民法院一审判处死刑的被告人提出上诉而没有委托辩护人的；

（三）公诉案件中，被告人因经济困难或者其他原因没有委托辩护人，人民法院决定为其提供指定辩护的；

（四）其他符合法律规定应当获得法律援助的。

第十二条 有下列情形之一的，法律援助机构不予法律援助：

（一）申请事项不属于人民法院或者仲裁机构受理范围，或者申请事项已超过诉讼时效或者仲裁时效的；

（二）申请劳动争议仲裁超过劳动争议仲裁申请时效的；

（三）申诉案件未经公安机关、人民检察院、人民法院重新立案的；

（四）公安机关、人民检察院、人民法院决定或者裁定不予受理且已生效的；

（五）申请相对人不明确，或者无法提供申请相对人详细住所的；

（六）所申请事项已经审结或者处理完毕，申请人就同一事项依同一理由申请法律援助的。

法律法规另有规定的从其规定。

第十三条 法律援助主要采取下列方式：

（一）代拟法律文书、提供法律意见；

（二）刑事辩护或者刑事代理；

（三）民事、行政诉讼代理；

（四）仲裁和其他非诉讼法律事务代理。

案情简单、诉讼标的小的，法律援助机构可以指导当事人自行诉讼。



第三章 申请、审查与实施



第十四条 人民法院指定辩护的刑事法律援助案件，由人民法院所在地的法律援助机构统一受理。

非指定辩护的刑事诉讼案件和其他诉讼案件，由申请人向有管辖权的人民法院所在地或者申请人住所地的法律援助机构提出申请。

非诉讼法律事务，由申请人向住所地或者工作单位所在地的法律援助机构提出申请。

法律法规另有规定的从其规定。

第十五条　申请人根据本条例第十四条的规定，可以向法律援助机构提出申请，法律援助机构不得推诿。

第十六条　法律援助机构对符合法律援助条件，但不属于本机构受理范围的法律援助申请，应当告知申请人到有受理权的法律援助机构申请。

第十七条 法律援助机构受理申请后，如果超出本机构受理能力，可以报请上一级法律援助机构协调处理。

上一级法律援助机构认为必要的，可以将法律援助事项交由下一级法律援助机构处理。

第十八条　两个以上法律援助机构都有权受理的法律援助事项，申请人可以向其中一个法律援助机构申请。

法律援助机构之间发生受理争议时，由其共同的上一级法律援助机构决定。

第十九条 被羁押的犯罪嫌疑人、被告人申请法律援助的，可以通过公安机关、人民检察院、人民法院向法律援助机构提出申请。

公安机关、人民检察院、人民法院在收到被羁押的犯罪嫌疑人、被告人提交的法律援助书面申请后二十四小时内，应当将法律援助申请转交有受理权的法律援助机构，并通知犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的法定代理人或者近亲属协助将申请法律援助所需要的相关证件和证明材料提供给受理的法律援助机构。

犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的法定代理人或者近亲属地址不详无法通知的，公安机关、人民检察院、人民法院应当在转交法律援助申请材料时一并告知有受理权的法律援助机构。

　　第二十条　有下列情形之一的，法律援助机构可以当即决定予以法律援助；法律服务机构也可以当即提供法律援助，同时报法律援助机构核准：

　　（一）可能造成社会秩序混乱，导致不良影响的；

　　（二）当事人可能面临生命安全和重大财产损害的。

第二十一条 申请法律援助应当填写法律援助申请表，法律援助申请表由省司法行政部门制定。

第二十二条 公民申请代理、刑事辩护的法律援助应当提交下列证件、证明材料：

（一）身份证或者其他有效的身份证明，代理申请人还应当提交有代理权的证明；

（二）经济困难的证明；

（三）与所申请法律援助事项有关的案件材料。

申请人提交的经济困难证明，包括家庭成员证明和家庭经济状况证明。

家庭成员是指与申请人共同生活的具有法定赡养、扶养、抚养关系的人员。家庭经济状况包括家庭成员收入状况、支出状况和其他资产状况。

申请相对人是申请人的家庭成员的，申请人无须提交家庭经济状况证明，但应出具本人的经济状况证明。

第二十三条 户口簿能证明家庭成员关系的，应当提供户口簿；户口簿不能证明的，由申请人户籍所在地或者经常居住地的派出所、居委会或者村委会提供证明。

申请人及其家庭成员有工作单位的，由申请人及其家庭成员所在工作单位出具收入证明。申请人及其家庭成员没有工作单位的，由申请人户籍所在地或者经常居住地的居委会或者村委会出具收入证明。

第二十四条 享受民政部门社会救济的人员申请法律援助的，无需提交经济困难证明。

第二十五条 申请人为无民事行为能力人或者限制民事行为能力人的，由其法定代理人依法代为申请。没有法定代理人的，由申请人所在地的居委会、村委会或者民政部门代为申请。

第二十六条 负责审查和批准法律援助申请的法律援助机构工作人员有下列情形之一的，应当回避：

（一）是法律援助事项的申请人或者申请人的近亲属；

（二）与申请法律援助事项有直接利害关系。

第二十七条　法律援助机构应当自收到法律援助申请及本条例第二十二条规定的证明材料之日起五个工作日内进行审查并按以下情形作出决定，书面通知申请人：

（一）对符合法律援助条件的，决定给予法律援助；

（二）对不符合法律援助条件或者提供虚假证据、证明材料的，决定不予法律援助。

对提供的证明及材料不齐全的，法律援助机构可以要求申请人作出必要的补充或者说明。

申请人补充材料、说明的时间不计入决定期限内。对疑难复杂的案件，经法律援助机构负责人批准，可以适当延长审查期限。

第二十八条 法律援助机构应当在作出给予法律援助决定之日起五个工作日内指定法律援助人员为受援人提供法律援助，并在指派之日起三个工作日内将确定的承办人员名单、联系方式告知受援人。受援人无法联系的除外。
第二十九条 申请人对不予法律援助的决定有异议的，可以向确定该法律援助机构的司法行政部门提出。司法行政部门应当在收到异议之日起五个工作日内进行审查，并将审查结果通知申请人和法律援助机构。

第三十条 由人民法院指定辩护的案件，人民法院应当在开庭十日前将指定辩护通知书和起诉书副本或者一审判决书副本送交有受理权的法律援助机构。

对人民法院指定辩护的案件，法律援助机构应当在开庭三日前将确定的承办人员名单回复作出指定的人民法院。

第三十一条 法律援助人员在办结法律援助事项后，应当从结案之日起一个月内向法律援助机构提交有关归档文件材料。

法律援助机构收到归档文件材料后，应当及时向受指派办理法律援助事项的法律援助人员支付办理法律援助事项补贴。



第四章 权利与义务



第三十二条 法律援助机构决定提供法律援助的案件，受援人可以向人民法院、仲裁机构申请缓收、减收或者免收案件受理费、诉讼费、仲裁费。

第三十三条 国家机关和有关单位对法律援助事项办理中利用档案资料进行的调查取证工作应当予以支持。查阅档案资料所涉及的费用，依照有关规定予以减免。

第三十四条 受援人申请司法鉴定、勘验、评估、审计的，司法机关、行政机关、财政拨款的司法鉴定、勘验、评估、审计机构应当缓收或者减免鉴定费、勘验费、评估费、审计费。

第三十五条　受援人在接受法律援助过程中有权了解为其提供法律援助的情况，如认为法律援助人员不依法履行职责，可以申请法律援助机构更换法律援助人员并提供证据。法律援助机构应当在七个工作日内决定是否更换法律援助人员。

第三十六条 受援人应当配合法律援助机构和法律援助人员的工作，不得有下列行为：

（一）提供虚假证据材料；

（二）以欺骗手段获得法律援助；

（三）无正当理由要求更换法律援助人员；

（四）要求法律援助人员提出没有事实和法律依据的请求。

第三十七条 受援人把法律援助人员办理法律援助事项所需差旅费、文印费、交通通讯费、调查取证费等必要开支列入诉讼请求，经人民法院判决由非受援败诉方承担的，受援人应当将上述费用交法律援助机构纳入法律援助经费。

第三十八条 法律援助人员在办理法律援助事项过程中，不得有下列行为：

（一）拖延办理法律援助事务；

（二）擅自终止或者转交他人办理法律援助事务；

（三）泄露当事人的隐私；

（四）向受援人收取财物或者牟取其他不正当利益。



第五章 法律责任



第三十九条 司法行政部门工作人员、法律援助机构及其工作人员和律师事务所、律师违反法律援助规定，依照有关法律、法规处理。

第四十条 基层法律服务工作者有下列情形之一的，由司法行政部门给予处分；情节严重，构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任：

（一）无正当理由拒绝接受法律援助案件的；

（二）拖延或者擅自终止、转交他人办理法律援助事务的；

（三）向受援人收取财物或者牟取其他不正当利益的。

第四十一条 受援人以欺骗手段获得法律援助的，应当偿付法律服务费用。



第六章 附则



第四十二条 本省设立的公职律师事务所及其公职律师应当承担法律援助义务，并参照本条例有关律师办理法律援助事项的规定执行。

第四十三条 广州铁路运输法院、广州铁路运输中级法院、广州海事法院、肇庆铁路运输法院受理的法律援助案件，适用本条例。

第四十四条 本条例自2007年1月1日起施行。